This paper studies two types of cognitive factors which have been assumed to underpin people's interpretation of conditional promises and threats: logic and socio-cognitive assumptions about what conditional promisors and threateners are obliged and permitted to do. We consider whether the logic of conditionals is compatible with the socio-cognitive assumptions underlying their interpretation or whether the two come apart. From the classical logical accounts of conditionals, almost all modern theories have inherited a constraint which specifies that a conditional cannot be true if its antecedent is true and consequent false. This logical constraint is widely assumed to constitute, at least partially, a conditional's semantics, or 'core meaning'. A replication of Beller et al.'s (2005) study, reported in this paper, calls for revisiting this long-standing, cross-theoretically assumed constraint. As predicted, we have found that, in English, conditional promises are generally consistent with this logical constraint, but threats are not. Our findings provide evidence for the existence of a new usage-based category of conditional threats, and support the claim that the observed logical asymmetry in the interpretation of conditional promises versus threats is just an epiphenomenon of a socio-cognitive symmetry which pertains to people's assumptions about the deontic commitments of both conditional promisors and threateners. Based on (i) the observed lack of uniform application of the logical constraint and (ii) a consideration of individual variation in the interpretation of conditional promises and threats, we argue that an exemplar approach to conditionals is a plausible option.
Introduction
Promises and threats play a central role in human communication, from family life to negotiation and politics. They are often formulated as conditionals:
(1) If you do the dishes, I'll let you go out.
(2) If you don't eat the dinner, I won't buy you this toy.
Comprehension of conditional promises and threats has been studied in psychology, linguistics and philosophy. However, there has been little agreement as to what exactly the encoded semantics of conditional sentences is.
In grammatical terms, conditionals are complex sentences which consist of an if-clause, often referred to as the antecedent, and the main clause, which is also known as the consequent. In terms of their semantics, conditionals have been traditionally (i.e. following Grice 1989) assumed to encode the logical, truth-functional operator of Material Implication (henceforth, MI). This approach is justified insofar as it allows making some interesting predictions about what speakers are committing themselves to when they use conditionals.
The logical operator MI is typically represented by means of a truth table, where the variable p stands for the antecedent, q for the consequent and the horseshoe symbol '' represents MI (other symbols used in the paper are: '&' for conjunction and '~' for negation). In the truth table and throughout the paper, T stands for 'true' and F for 'false'. Let us now look at the predictions that MI makes for a conditional promise like that in (1), repeated below for convenience.
In the first line of the truth table, pq is T in a situation in which p is T and q is T. Applying this to our example, the conditional in (1) would be T -i.e. the speaker would have spoken truly -in a situation in which the speaker lets the hearer go out (q is T) after the hearer has done the dishes (p is T). It is worth noticing that this situation (or such a combination of truth values for p and q)
corresponds to an intuitive understanding of what it means for the speaker of (1) to keep the terms of the conditional promise she made (the pronoun 'she' is used to refer to the speaker and 'he' to the hearer, unless specified otherwise in our examples).
Moving on to line two of Table 1 , here the speaker has spoken falsely (as pq is F), which corresponds to a situation in which the hearer does the dishes (p is T) and the speaker does not let him go out (q is F). Note the further predictive power of MI here: line two formally excludes the possibility of a true conditional where p is T and q is F -i.e. it excludes (p & ~q) -and, interestingly, this truth value combination corresponds to an intuitive understanding of what would count as breaking the terms of a conditional promise by the speaker.
Line 3 may initially seem counterintuitive as here MI predicts a situation in which a truthful promisor (pq is T) is over-generous in that she lets the hearer go out (q is T) even though the hearer hasn't done the dishes (p is F). However, on reflection, the speaker of (1) only said what she will do in a situation in which the hearer does the dishes, i.e. in which the hearer makes p true (henceforth, makes p). Thus, it may be argued that, in uttering (1), the speaker has not committed herself to any action in a situation in which the hearer doesn't do the dishes, i.e. in which the hearer makes p false (henceforth, makes p). The predictions on line 4 are straightforward: a truthful promisor (pq is T)
has the option of not letting the hearer go out, i.e. of making q (because q is F) in a situation in which the hearer hasn't done the dishes, i.e. made p (because p is F).
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This can be expressed using the following logical notation: ((pq) & p)  q. Applying this to our example, if the speaker of (1) has spoken truly (pq) and the hearer has done the dishes (p), it is certain that the speaker will let the hearer go out (q), all other things being equal.
The second inference, Modus Tollens, follows from the combination of lines 2 and 4 and states that if the conditional is T and q is F, p must be F: ((pq) & q)  p. In example (1), this means that if the speaker has spoken truly (pq) and the hearer hasn't been allowed to go out (q),
we can be certain that the hearer has not done the dishes (p), all other things being equal.
According to the truth-functional approach, Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens follow semantically -i.e. independently of context -from a conditional statement. Nothing else follows semantically. For example, we have already seen that in (1) the speaker is semantically permitted to let the hearer go out (to make q) regardless of whether the hearer does the dishes or not. Hence, according to the logic of MI, one cannot infer with certainty that a truthful speaker of (1) will refrain from letting the hearer go out (make q) in a situation in which the hearer hasn't done the dishes (has made p). Such inference, called the Fallacy of Denying the Antecedent -formally, ((pq) & p)  q -is not licensed by MI. Neither is the Fallacy of Affirming the Consequent -formally, ((pq) & q)  p -which would allow one to infer with certainty that the hearer has done the dishes (made p) based on the information that a truthful speaker of (1) has let the hearer go out (has made q).
Nevertheless, people often embark on these two fallacious inferences. They do so when they interpret the utterance of a conditional "if p, q" as a biconditional "if and only if p, q". For example, the hearer of (1) may believe that he will be let out by the speaker if and only if he does the dishes; that is, if he doesn't do the dishes, the speaker will not let him go out. Standard approaches assume that when people interpret if as if and only if, they do so via a pragmatic, context-dependent process Language & Cognition 10 (2018) https://doi.org/10.1017/langcog.2018.10 6 of biconditionalisation (Grice 1989; Comrie 1986; Levinson 1983; Smith and Smith 1988; van der Auwera 1997; Horn 2000; Noh 2000) .
The traditional truth-functional approaches have enjoyed relative popularity in post-Gricean linguistics (e.g. Comrie 1986; Smith & Smith 1988; Noh 2000) and in some main theoretical approaches in the psychology of reasoning (e.g. Rips 1994; Braine & O'Brien 1998) . Philosophers generally agree that conditionals cannot be semantically modelled on MI (e.g. Adams 1965 , Stalnaker 1975 , Edgington 1995 , Lycan 2001 , a position in which they are joined by some psychologists (e.g. Oaksford & Chater 2003; Evans & Over 2004; Evans et al. 2007 ) and linguists (e.g. van der Auwera 1997; Sweetser 1990: 113-141 In recent years, there has been a series of experiments in social psychology which report on a promise versus threat asymmetry in establishing when a conditional promise versus a conditional threat count as false (Beller 2002; Beller, Bender & Kuhnmünch 2005; Beller & Bender 2004; Beller, Bender & Song 2009 ). The authors' deontic commitment and emotional level analysis uncovers systematic differences in how conditional promises versus threats are interpreted. In particular, these studies found that breaking the terms of a conditional promise corresponds to (p & q), which is predicted by the logic of MI, whereas breaking the terms of a conditional threat corresponds to (p & q), which is not predicted by MI. Relatedly, the authors have found that the conditional threatener is not obliged to make q in a situation in which the hearer made p (see also Searle & Vanderveken 1985; Verbrugge et al. 2004 Verbrugge et al. , 2005 . This is important since a lack of The aim of the current paper is twofold. Firstly, Beller et al.'s studies were carried out in German (Beller 2002; Beller, Bender & Kuhnmünch 2005) , Tongan (Beller & Bender 2004) and Mandarin Chinese (Beller, Bender & Song 2009 ). We want to strengthen the cross-linguistic validity of the results by replicating the study on English conditionals. Secondly, we want to extend the previous studies by considering the aforementioned asymmetry between conditional promises and threats with regard to the cross-theoretically assumed (p & q) constraint.
If it is found that the (p & q) constraint does not apply to all conditionals, then the question arises whether it can actually be thought of as constituting the core meaning, or schematic representation, of conditionals. We will consider this question in relation to exemplar semantics. 
Beller's Deontic Commitments Hypothesis
Examples (1) and (2), repeated below for convenience, exemplify two types of conditional inducements, i.e. statements made to influence hearers' behaviour by telling them about the consequences of their behaviour (Searle 1971) .
(1) is used to influence the hearer's behaviour by promising that q (I'll let you go out) will be true if p (you do the dishes) is true, and (2) is used to influence the hearer's behaviour by threatening that q (I won't buy you this toy) will be true if p (you don't eat the dinner) is true. As is well-known from the literature (e.g. Searle & Vanderveken 1985; Fillenbaum 1986; Beller 2002) , there is a motivationallevel difference between conditional promises and threats: whereas with promises, p is a desired behaviour for which there is a reward (q), with threats, p is an undesired behaviour for which there is a punishment (q). Thus with promises the hearer is motivated (and thus expected) to make p, whereas with threats the hearer is motivated (and thus expected) to make ~p. As pointed out by Beller (2002) , this difference at the motivational level gives rise to a difference in deontic commitments. Beller (2002) argues that crucial to the interpretation of conditional inducements is the question of what the speaker is obliged to do and what the speaker is permitted to do when p is false (i.e. when ~p is the case). With promises, a cooperative hearer is one who makes p (does the dishes).
When the hearer cooperates, the speaker is obliged to make q (let the hearer go out). From this it follows that the speaker is not permitted to make ~q (refrain from letting the hearer go out) -this is because making ~q would amount to breaking the terms of the conditional promise. With threats, however, a cooperative hearer is one who makes ~p (eats the dinner). When the hearer cooperates, the speaker is obliged to make ~q (buy the hearer the toy). From this it follows that the speaker is not Finally, the emotional level deals with emotional reactions which are elicited by goal-congruent versus goal-incongruent events (e.g. Roseman et al. 1996) . From the perspective of the hearer of a conditional inducement, a goal-congruent event corresponds to the hearer getting a reward or avoiding a punishment as a result of performing the action desired by the speaker. A goalincongruent event is when the hearer does not get a reward or receives a punishment despite performing the action desired by the speaker. Accordingly, hearers are predicted to feel joy when they receive a deserved reward, relief when a negative event -such as punishment -does not happen and anger when the speaker does not cooperate in a situation in which the hearer has cooperated by performing the action desired by the speaker. Thus, the hearer's emotional reaction to the events that have occurred allows detecting whether the speaker has kept or broken the terms of their conditional inducement.
We tested the predictions of this multi-level analysis in two parts of the experiment, which are described in the next section.
The Replication

PARTICIPANTS
70 students took part in the experiment. The students came from different disciplines (e.g. literature,
history, theology, education, sports sciences, business studies) at York St John University, UK. 34
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MATERIALS
For the current study, the instrument used in the German studies by Beller (2002) and Beller et al. (2005) was translated into English. The emotional analysis was simplified (as in Beller 2002) to include two situations -mutual cooperation and unexpected non-cooperation. The extended analysis of mutual non-cooperation and unexpected cooperation was not included because the emotional analysis was not the main focus of the current paper. We had to make several translation decisions that need to be explained here. The first decision concerned the translation of the emotions. The
German emotion adjectives were translated into English in the following way: erleichtert (relieved),
ängstlich (anxious). We used the Berlin Affective Word List Reloaded (Võ et al. 2009 ) to examine the affective valence and arousal ratings of the German emotion expressions. The German word Ärger 1 , which can be translated into English as annoyance or anger, is rated for affective valence at -1.9 on a 7-point scale ranging from 'very negative' -3 to 'very positive' 3 and for arousal at 3.94 on a 5-point scale ranging from 'low' 1 to 'high' 5 (Võ et al. 2009 ). This, we believe, has minimised the risk of the epistemic interpretation. Additionally, there was a 'Please explain your choice' section after each of the deontic tasks, which allowed identifying any issues with ambiguity and also potential issues with the strength of the modals.
The questionnaire consisted of two parts, Part I and Part II.
Part I
In Part I, conditional inducements were embedded in scenarios of mutual exchange. was the speaker and Frank the hearer; in the other half, the roles were reversed. Each scenario was followed by four tasks: formulation, inference, sequence and emotions.
In the formulation task, the participants were provided with one of the mutual exchange scenarios, like the one below, and told which inducement type (promise or threat) the speaker will use.
Usually, Frank doesn't lend his bike to his schoolmates. However, Henry wants to borrow it today.
Henry tries to reach this goal by promising Frank something. Henry knows that Frank would like his help with today's homework, but usually Henry doesn't help him.
The participants were then presented with four conditionals (canonical, complementary, reversed and reversed-complementary) and instructed to select the one that seemed 'the best choice' for the speaker's intended inducement.
Beginning from the inference task, the participants were given the context stories along with the canonical conditional, as in the example below.
Henry promised:
"Frank, if you lend me your bike, then I will help you with your homework."
The instructions asked participants to choose 'the most probable' conclusion that could be made based on the given conditional. The participants were choosing between three options:
complementary, reversed and reversed-complementary.
In the sequence task, the participants were instructed to decide on the order of actions that will follow once the conditional inducement has been made.
In the emotion task a conditional inducement was given in a context story and the task mentioned that the hearer co-operated (made p for promises, made ~p for threats), as in the example below.
Henry promised: "Frank, if you lend me your bike, then I will help you with your homework." After that, Frank lent his bike to Henry.
Informants were then to decide:
what the speaker does (makes q or makes ~q) if he acts versus doesn't act according to the terms of the given inducement; and -which feeling the hearer will have towards the speaker (relieved, happy, annoyed, ashamed, sad, bored or anxious)
The tasks were ordered as described above. However, as the answers to inference task could potentially influence the answers to sequence task, the order of these two tasks was varied to avoid The mutual lending and mutual destruction scenarios were set to ask different questions: whether the speaker is obliged/permitted to cooperate (lend the computer game) and whether the speaker is obliged/permitted not to cooperate (smash the Playmobil farm) respectively, each for the cooperative hearer and the non-cooperative hearer scenarios. These questions allowed us to obtain data on: In Part II, tasks 1 and 2 were presented on one page as they shared the same scenario. The same obtained for tasks 3 and 4. The participants were instructed to work on the tasks in the given order, not to return to a previous question and to take as much time as they needed. All materials were presented in English.
DESIGN AND PROCEDURE
There were four experimental groups corresponding to four different scenarios. The four scenarios varied between groups and the speech acts were balanced between parts of the questionnaire. In assigning participants to groups, we controlled for the degree they were studying for (humanities versus non-humanities) and gender.
The questionnaire was administered in a teaching room on several days during a two-week period. Some participants were recruited via an email invitation; others were recruited on-the-spot on campus. The participants received a voucher as an incentive. All participants were asked not to discuss the study with anyone until the end of the two-week period. After a general introduction page, four tasks of Part I were followed by four tasks of Part II.
RESULTS
Part I
Formulation task. The results for the formulation task are presented in Table 2 . Inference task. The results for the inference task are presented in Table 3 . Sequence task. The predicted action sequence was that the 'hearer decides first' whether to cooperate with the speaker, after which it will become clear whether the speaker should cooperate.
Similarly to Beller (2002) and Beller et al. (2005) , the predicted action sequence was chosen by 63 (87%) of the participants, p<.001, binomial distribution with N=70 and r=1/2. Beller et al. (2005) report that whereas the hearer was said to feel a negative emotion if the speaker didn't keep the rule 100% of the time (aggregated over both speech acts) and a positive emotion if the speaker kept the rule 80.6% of the time (aggregated over both speech acts), 24.2% of the informants in the threat scenario indicated that the hearer feels annoyed even if the speaker cooperated.
In our study, the speech act factor was found to contribute significantly in both situations:
where the speaker followed and didn't follow the rule of the inducement. The results are summarised in Looking at the emotions in more detail, following the rule of the promise by the speaker resulted predominantly in the hearer feeling happy (55.6%) or relieved (38.8%). As for the negative emotions, 45.5% of our informants chose 'annoyed' in a situation where the speaker followed the rule of the threat. This number is higher than 15% (Beller 2002) or 24.2% (Beller et al. 2005 ) of the German participants who chose 'annoyed' in this situation.
Moving on to the uncooperative speaker scenarios, with promises, the hearer is said to feel a negative emotion 100% of the time, 88.9% of which is comprised by 'annoyed' (comparable to Beller 2002 and Beller et al. 2005) . With threats, the hearer is said to feel a negative emotion by 26 out of 34 participants (76.5%) in our study, p<.003, binomial distribution with N=34 and r=5/7.
Looking at the negative emotions in more detail, 52.9% of the participants in our study said that the hearer will feel 'annoyed' and 23.6% said that the hearer will feel 'sad'. In the German studies, feeling 'annoyed' was chosen more often than the overall number for negative emotions in our study:
by over 90% of participants in Beller (2002) and Beller et al. (2005) .
Part II
The χ 2 test revealed that the speech act factor (promise or threat) did not contribute significantly to any of the tasks (p=0.34). Hence, the data for promise and threat scenarios were aggregated. 
Hearer cooperated: Speaker's obligation and permission to keep the terms of the inducement.
The informants were asked whether the speaker is obliged to keep the terms of the inducement (i.e.
Peter must lend Claire his computer game) if the hearer cooperated (if Claire lent Peter her comic book). For promises, mutual cooperation would correspond to the speaker making q (lend computer game) if the hearer makes p (lend comic book) -i.e. (p & q). For threats, that would correspond to speaker making ~q (lend computer game) if the hearer makes ~p (lends comic book) -i.e. (~p & ~q).
69.5% of the people in the mutual lending scenario indicated that the speaker is obliged to cooperate (lend out his computer game) if the hearer cooperated (lent out her comic book), 25% of the informants indicated that there is no obligation for the speaker to cooperate if the hearer cooperated and 5.5% were undecided.
As for permission to keep the terms of the inducement, 82.8% of the participants indicated that the speaker is permitted to keep the terms of the inducement, 14.3% indicated it cannot be decided and 2.9% indicated that the speaker is not permitted to keep the terms of the inducement.
Hearer cooperated: Speaker's permission and obligation to break the terms of the inducement. The informants were asked whether the speaker is permitted to break the terms of the inducement (i.e. to destroy Sarah's farm) in a situation where the hearer cooperated (Sarah didn't destroy George's car). For promises, lack of cooperation on the part of the speaker corresponds to (p & q), whereas for threats to (p & q). 85.3% of the participants in this scenario said that the speaker is not permitted to destroy Sarah's farm, 8.9% said that the speaker is permitted to destroy Sarah's farm and 5.8% said it cannot be decided.
As for obligation to break the terms of the inducement, 88.2% of the participants said that there is no obligation for the speaker to break the terms of the inducement, whereas 11.8% said it cannot be decided. 70.6% of respondents said that the speaker is not obliged to follow through with the negative consequences of the inducement, 23.5% said the speaker is obliged to follow through with the negative consequences of the inducement and 5.9% said that it cannot be decided.
As for permission, 73.5% of respondents said that the speaker is permitted to follow through with the negative consequences of the inducement, 17.7% of people were undecided and 8.8% said that the speaker is not permitted to follow through with the negative consequences of the inducement. The number for permission is much higher than the 36% of informants who chose this option in Beller et al.'s (2005) study. Beller et al. (2005) explain this content effect by reference to an implicit social rule that people are not permitted to destroy others' belongings.
DISCUSSION
Part I
The findings from the formulation task (86.1% canonical promise, 61.8% canonical threat) raise an interesting question, which potentially concerns socio-cultural differences in the strategies for formulating conditional inducements. We merely point to this issue here, as a meaningful Looking at our data, the English participants were more likely to choose a canonical threat formulation than the Tongan participants, but less likely to do so than the German informants.
However, caution is needed before we attribute the differences in the formulation task to cross-cultural differences. Firstly, Beller and Bender's (2004) Tongan participants were secondary school students with the mean age of 15.4 whereas the German participants were university students with the mean age of 23.8 (Beller 2002) and 22.7 (Beller et al. 2005) . This opens up the possibility that the more mature German students may have been better at putting aside the socio-linguistic appropriateness bias whilst engaging in the inducement formulation task: despite their formulation choices in the experiment, in real life, they may as well prefer to formulate their threats as promises.
This hypothesis receives some support from Beller et al.'s (2009) study which investigated the responses of secondary school German participants with the mean age of 16.6. This study found that only 16% of the participants chose the canonical threat formulation (59% complementary, 22% reversed). In our view, the differences in the formulation of conditional inducements require further investigation. Nevertheless, the overall results obtained from the Tongan study, Beller et al.'s (2009) German study and the present study reveal an interesting difference. If conditional threats, but not promises, are more strongly associated with the complementary formulation, then, potentially, the biconditional interpretation is more prominent with this type of inducement.
The inference task revealed no reliable difference in the most probable inference for conditional promises versus threats. However, we do not think that the results give a conclusive answer as to the question of whether there are differences in 'the most probable' inferential patterns where participants are given the major premise plus the relevant minor premise and are asked whether a given conclusion follows, or what conclusion follows, would be better suited to test whether there are differences in the most probable inferential patterns associated with promises and threats (see e.g. Cummins et al. 1991 , Thompson 1994 ).
The results of the sequence task confirm the predicted action sequence: the hearer decides first whether to cooperate, after which it becomes clear whether the speaker should cooperate. This result strengthens the findings from the emotion tasks. There are several interesting findings in the Emotion task. With respect to the hearer's positive emotions in a situation in which the speaker followed the rule of the promise, our overall findings are similar to Beller (2002) and Beller et al. (2005) but differ in that the German participants chose 'relieved' less frequently than the English participants: 75% 'happy' and 25% 'relieved' in (Beller 2002) and 67% 'happy' and 27% 'relieved' in (Beller et al. 2005 ), compared with 55.6%
'happy' and 38.5% 'relieved' in the present study. Despite being classified as a positive emotion, the more frequent choice of 'relieved' among the English participants seems to suggest higher levels of anxiety in anticipation of the speaker's action -typically, one feels 'relieved' if some negative event that one has been anticipating hasn't happened. Indeed, these results are consistent with Beller's motivational-level analysis and the resulting predicted action sequence. It follows from the hearerfirst-speaker-second action sequence that once the speaker has uttered the inducement and the hearer has fulfilled the speaker's goal, the hearer has to wait for the speaker to fulfil his goal. Since the speaker has the temporal advantage, relief on the part of hearer is plausible to occur for both promises and threats.
As for the finding that 48.5% of the English participants chose a negative emotion when the speaker followed the rule of a conditional threat, this kind of emotional choice is likely to stem from the fact that the formulation of conditional threats involves the expression of aversive, or punishment-maximising, motives rather than appetitive, or reward-maximising motives, as is the case with promises (Roseman et al. 1996) . So the hearer is judged as feeling a negative emotion
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Overall, our findings for the hearer's emotion part of this task support the results obtained for the speaker's action part. If the speaker follows the rule of the inducement, the hearer is said to feel a positive emotion and any statistically significant choice of a negative emotion in such a situation is dictated by the fact that the hearer was induced by a threat. If the speaker did not follow the rule of the inducement, the hearer is said to feel a negative emotion most of the time.
To summarise, in the first part of the experiment, we have found that (a) conditional threats tend to be more strongly associated with the complementary formulation, suggesting that the biconditional interpretation, in particular the inference of Denying the Antecedent, may be more prominent for this type of a conditional inducement. We have also found that (b) breaking the terms of a conditional promise in English is associated with (p & ~q), whereas (c) breaking the terms of a conditional threat is associated with (~p & q). These findings were further supported by the results of the hearer's emotion task. Given the slightly lower than expected result for the speaker's obligation to keep the terms of the inducement (69.5%), we decided to see whether there was any explanation for it in the qualitative data. Interestingly, out of eleven participants who did not give the predicted answer, five participants working in the threat scenario said that the speaker is not obliged to lend Claire his computer game because he did not promise that he would. This suggests that these participants did not interpret the utterance of a conditional threat as giving rise to the deontic commitments of its complementary promise and calls for more research into individual variation in the interpretation of conditional inducements. We come back to this point in section 4.
Part II
The results obtained for the uncooperative speaker scenarios also strengthen the findings from the previous studies. When the hearer doesn't cooperate, the speaker is permitted but not In the next section, we discuss our findings -about the speaker's obligation/permission to keep the terms of a given inducement, to break the terms of an inducement, to be the better person and to follow through with negative consequences of one's inducement -in relation to the (p & q)
constraint. constraint applies uniformly to all "if p, q" conditionals? As predicted by Beller's deontic commitments hypothesis, whereas the majority of participants feel that the speaker of a conditional threat is obliged to (line 2) make ~q in a situation in which the hearer made ~p, the speaker of a conditional promise is typically judged as permitted to (line 11), but not obliged to (line 9), make ~q in a situation in which the hearer made ~p. These results show that (p & q) is more strongly associated with conditional threats than promises.
Implications: The (P & Q) Constraint
As for breaking the terms of a conditional inducement, from the threatener's obligation to make ~q in a situation in which the hearer made ~p (line 2), it follows that breaking the terms of a conditional threat should correspond to (p & q) . Indeed, the majority of participants indicated that the conditional threatener is not permitted to make q in a situation in which the hearer made ~p (line 4). With conditional promises, the majority of participants feel that the conditional promisor is obliged to (line 1) make q in a situation in which the hearer made p and, consequently, not permitted to (line 3) make ~q in a situation in which the hearer made p. These results indicate that breaking the terms of a conditional promise in English is associated with (p & ~q), whereas breaking the terms of a conditional threat is associated with (~p & q).
With regards to our last question -concerning the conditional threatener's deontic commitments in a situation in which the hearer didn't cooperate (i.e. made p) -the majority of participants indicated that the conditional threatener is permitted to make ~q in a such situation (line 6). Crucially, this permission to make ~q in such a situation is equivalent to the lack of obligation to
The findings reported in this paper are controversial in the light of the standard, and crosstheoretical, assumption that the (p & q) constraint applies uniformly to "if p, q" conditionals.
More generally, the findings are controversial in the light of the traditional theories that require some schematised representation, abstracted from past experiences, to be involved in the process of utterance interpretation. However, the findings are in line with the theory of illocutionary acts (Searle & Vanderveken 1985) and with previous empirical work on languages other than English (Beller 2002; Beller et al. 2005; Verbrugge et al. 2004 Verbrugge et al. , 2005 .
This gives rise to two questions. Firstly, we need to consider whether it is actually possible for a threat which does not involve the (p & q) constraint to function as a successful inducement.
Secondly, assuming a positive answer to the first question, we need to consider which type of approach to utterance interpretation is most compatible with the findings. Notice that our results (lines 6 and 8 in Table 5 ) indicate that even though a conditional threatener is permitted to be the better person, they are not obliged to be the better person. Therefore, it is plausible to assume that, in a situation in which the hearer of a conditional threat made p (did not cooperate), a lack of the (p & q) constraint will keep two possibilities open: the possibility that the speaker makes q (is the better person) and the possibility that the speaker makes q (follows through with the negative consequences of the inducement). One of the factors which would make such a threat a successful inducement then -in fact, one which would make it a threat -is the mere possibility of the threatener following through with the negative consequences of the inducement.
WHAT MAKES
Coming back to our example, even though Sarah assumes that George is unlikely to make q (smash her farm), there's always the possibility that he might behave in an untypical way and this time follow through with the negative consequences of his threat. Being aware of this possibility, coupled with a desire to prevent it from becoming true, is sufficient to induce Sarah into cooperation.
As hypothesised by Sztencel (2018) This hypothesis is supported by our findings in the following way. The constraint in (i) is evidenced by lines 2 and 4 in Table 5 and it prevents the threatener from breaking the terms of the inducement.
Thus, assuming that the threatener has spoken truly, this constraint gives the hearer grounds to believe that his cooperative behaviour will be met with the speaker's cooperative behaviour. This guarantees that making p will actually be beneficial to the hearer; in other words, (i) provides an appetitive motive for the hearer to make p. On top of this, the uncertainty which follows from (ii) - 
TOWARDS AN EXEMPLAR SEMANTICS FOR CONDITIONALS
Now that we have established that the better person possibility threats can be successful inducements, we need to face a possible objection to the argument that the existence of such threats undermines the claim that the (p & q) constraint is the 'core meaning' of conditionals. It's plausible to imagine an objection along the following lines: any theory which takes the (p & q)
constraint to be the 'core meaning', or abstract representation, of a conditional is capable of dealing with the findings of this paper -it could be argued that the lack of application of the (p & q)
constraint is established via a pragmatic inference. But there are several issues with such a hypothetical objection.
The first issue is illustrated by the following example:
(3) If you do it again, I'll play the guitar.
As argued in Sztencel (2014 Sztencel ( , 2018 , (3) constraint applies in this case, it needs to be established whether we are dealing with a promise or a threat, which, in turn, depends on the hearer's assumptions about the speaker's knowledge of the hearer's likes and dislikes. In other words, it is not the case that the context merely modulates or enriches the purportedly encoded abstract representation -in fact, contextual, holistic, inference, which involves complex assumptions about one's interlocutor, leads one to establish that the (p & q) constraint applies or that it does not.
The second issue concerns the explanatory potentials of a logico-semantic approach versus a socio-cognitive approach to conditional inducements (Sztencel 2018) . One problem for a logicosemantic approach is that it would have to square the claim that the (p & q) constraint is the 'core meaning' of conditionals with the issue illustrated by (3) above. Another, very significant, problem is that the logico-semantic (p & q) constraint makes different predictions for conditional promises and threats with regards to the deontic commitments. Notice that the lack of permission to make q when the hearer made p amounts to:
-for promises, the lack of permission to break the terms of the promise in a situation in which the hearer cooperates This brings us to the importance of interlocutor-specific memories and their influence on the interpretation of conditional inducements. Admittedly, the picture gleaned from our data is a bit simplistic in that it does not tap into individual variation which is likely to pertain to conditional threats. Now, in our examples, the majority of participants indicated that the speaker is permitted to be the better person. However, research has shown that interlocutor-specific information is one of many cues which are simultaneously integrated during language processing and thus may place immediate/direct constraints on the processes of utterance production and comprehension (e.g. 'specific information finds a natural expression in an exemplar model, where the storage and categorization of all detail both predictable and idiosyncratic is considered to be a basic response to linguistic input. ' Furthermore, Chandler (2017: 81) argues that exemplar models eliminate the need to try to identify 'resident linguistic generalisations' and fare better to explain categorisation. In relation to conditionals specifically, compatible proposals have been made in epistemology. Douven (2015) , for example, argues that instead of searching for a unitary semantics of if -an approach that has so far proven fruitless -the time has come to address conditionals from an epistemological perspective (see also Douven 2013; Krzyżanowska et al. 2013; Rescher 2007 ), a perspective which foregrounds the importance of knowledge structures in the comprehension of conditionals.
Exemplar approaches to semantics are based on exemplar models of categorisation (e.g. Hintzman 1986; Nosofsky 1988; Skousen 1989) . At the heart of exemplar semantics lies the hypothesis that meaning, or rather meaning potential, of words as expression types is no more and no less than the collection of token-experiences they are associated with (e.g. Hintzman 1986; Recanati 1998; Sztencel 2012 Sztencel , 2014 Sztencel , 2018 . For example, on Hintzman's (1986) model, every event to which a person attends is stored in long term memory as an individual memory trace. Each memory trace is constituted by a configuration of primitive properties (e.g. modality-specific sensory features, simple emotional tones, temporal relations, abstract relations) in terms of which experiences are cognised.
Memory traces are aggregated based on their similarity, which is established by the matching of the constitutive primitive properties. Abstract representations do not have a special status and are not stored in a functionally separate memory system but can be retrieved on-line from a pool of episodic memory traces, or exemplars, and stored as another memory trace (Hintzman 1986 ; see also Barsalou 2005) . For conditional inducements, this means that any abstractions that may be retrieved on-line will be stored in the memory aggregate representing the category of conditional utterances along with other, more specific, experience records. We can represent such abstractions using the logical How would the two approaches -the traditional and exemplar -fare to explain our example in which George threatened Sarah that he will smash her farm if she smashes his car, in a context in which it is assumed that George is unlikely to follow through with the negative consequences of his threat? On the traditional approach, some specifically linguistic/lexical system would provide the (p & q) constraint presumably to aid the process of utterance interpretation. This constraint would then have to be dropped/disregarded in response to the context. In contrast to this, the exemplar approach (e.g. Hinztman's 1986) would require us to assume that a mental representation of the acoustic properties of George's utterance (i.e. a mental representation of the utterance's form) combines with Sarah's assumptions about George (those which are salient to her at the time) to constitute a retrieval probe which is sent to all memory traces stored in Sarah's long-term memory. The traces in Sarah's long-term memory are then activated according to their similarity to the probe -that is, the traces which are records of experiences of relevant forms and of George's past behaviour will be most strongly activated. The pattern of most strongly activated properties that resonates back from the long-term memory in response to the probe is called the echo. The echo, on the exemplar approach, constitutes the meaning of a given utterance. Given the context that we imagined for this scenario, the echo is likely to be consistent with the (p & q) but not the (p & q) constraint. Observe further that the exemplar semantics' assumption that all traces are activated in the process of echo retrieval is essential to George's threat functioning as a successful inducement. This is because Sarah's assumption that George may after all behave in a way which is untypical for him must also be based on her knowledge that some threateners follow through with the negative consequences of their threats and that people do not always behave in predictable ways. It is this wealth of knowledge (wealth of records of experiences) that saves Sarah from making an error of inductive reasoning (i.e. from assuming that George won't retaliate because he's never done so) and makes her act in a way wished for by George.
Admittedly, the above has provided a sketch of how an exemplar account would deal with Sarah's interpretation of George's threat. Furthermore, there is no space on this occasion to provide a more substantial argument for an exemplar semantics approach as opposed to more generally understood encyclopaedic approaches. But we hope to have shown that it is worth exploring the explanatory potential of exemplar models. We would like to argue that there is a real need for research into the interaction between (a) the interlocutor-specific information and (b) the inferential patterns that lead to the assumption, or otherwise, of the (p & q) constraint to particular uses of "if p, q" threats. We believe that, if the deontic commitments of conditional inducers (e.g. Searle & Vanderveken 1985; Verbrugge et al. 2004 Verbrugge et al. , 2005 Beller et al. 2005) are to be explained, attention needs to be refocused from the search for schematic representations of 'core meaning' to the direct relevance, to utterance interpretation, of stored exemplars.
Conclusion
The results of both parts of the experiment corroborate the predictions of Beller's deontic commitments hypothesis for conditional promises and threats in English. With regards to our specific research questions, we have found that breaking the terms of a conditional promise in English is associated with (p & ~q), whereas breaking the terms of a conditional threat is associated with (~p & q). We also found that (p & ~q) is permitted for conditional threats, which undermines the claim that the (p & q) constraint is definitional of the encoded semantics, or 'core meaning', of conditionals.
We have found evidence for a usage category of conditional threats called the better person possibility threats and, relatedly, put forward a proposal that an exemplar semantics fares better to explain the interpretation of conditional inducements.
